A history of political Iran, and why US policy towards it is wrong.

A brief history of political Iran¹

Why have Middle Eastern political realities evolved the way they have? The people of the Middle East have had ambitions and anxieties concerning independence, autonomy and statehood entering the 20^th century, despite popular misconceptions which see them as unsophisticated and unaware or uncaring of such subjects until the last few decades. Yet these ambitions were never realized. The modern Middle East states remain weak, both internally, and externally as players in the world stage, even as they have been extremely durable and capable of surviving dramatic political shocks.

There is no single reason that can explain how political realities evolved in the Middle East, and no single dynamic that explains the developments in each separate state. What we have is a different mosaic of factors, both internal and external, that have shaped each nation in its own unique way. Many in the West tend to think of the political realities of the Middle East as a monolithic whole, whereas nothing could be further from the truth. From Lebanon to Turkey, and from Iran to the states of the Arabian peninsula, the differences between the systems of governance and attitudes towards them is vast. We should avoid over generalizing when examining the whole of the Middle East- instead each country is best seen on its own, examining both the factors unique to it, and those that have affected the whole region.

Following, is a very brief introduction to the political history of the state of Iran. What I attempt to show is the often tragic circumstances and events that have shaped the country, the great and largely negative role external powers have played in its development, and also to dispel the misconceptions that many have regarding the country, and show how current US policies towards it are ill-thought and historically unsound.

Entering the 20^th century, Iran was somewhat of a backwater in the Middle East. Weakened and shrunken as it was, its neighboring Ottoman empire had nevertheless a strong central government and administration, a developed economic infrastructure, strong cultural ties with the West, and a capable, though not comparable to that of the Great Powers, army. Iran on the other hand was undeveloped, with a weak army, and a central government that could control little more than some of the bigger cities, the remaining countryside being controlled by tribal chieftains. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the country was in effect a pawn and servant of the great powers, especially Russia and Great Britain. The Russian czar effectively completely controlled the northern third of the country and the Qazar monarch- even the monarch’s elite Cossack brigade was funded by the czar and led by Russian officers.

The South, though less directly, but just as importantly, was controlled by Great Britain, and British economic interests which had control of whatever little economic development there existed in the country. The country had thus become in effect a battleground for the two Great Powers. This was facilitated by the policies of Nasir al-Din, the Qazar shah until 1896. The British were alarmed by Russian influence in Iran, which they feared might reach across to India, and made it clear to the czar they would not allow excessive advances. Both powers wished to avoid a war over Iran, so the country was essentially allowed to exist only as a buffer between the interests of the two. Nasir al-Din, wishing to retain his own rule and his own luxurious royal lifestyle, and at the same time avoid any one power from gaining excessive influence (forcing the other to intervene with potential catastrophic results for the shah) sought to play the two Great Powers against each other, by offering economic concessions and rights to each. The result was twofold. Nasir al-Din gave vast economic concessions and the rights for the infrastructural and commodity control and development of his country for pitiably little in return, and at the same time, the constant disagreement of one power over the concessions made to the other meant very little actual development took place in the country.

The significant power and influence of the religious establishment can be understood through these late 19^th century dynamics. Whereas the Safavid shahs claimed to have divine authority from the Hidden Imam, the Qazar dynasty which replaced the Safavids in the late 18^th century claimed no such thing. As already seen, with the Qazar shahs having little actual central power themselves, the religious establishment in the country was free to assert for itself considerable power and claim to have sole legitimacy in speaking for religious matters, and the religious interpretation of political and economic issues. Those particularly learned, and seen as having authority to speak on such matters, were called the mujtahids. As the number of mujtahids increased in the 19^th century, those who were seen as having even superior judgment, and whose word carried precedence over that of other religious leaders were given the title of majra al-taqlid, and in the 20^th century it became customary for them to be referred to as ayatollah- the eye of God. During the reign of the Qazar shahs, especially during the era of disastrous economic policies of Nasir al-Din, the religious establishment came to be seen as the most legitimate and powerful source of opposition to the shah, and its positions carried great weight amongst the populace. When Nasir al-Din sold to a single British company the right to produce, sell and handle Iran’s entire tobacco crop, a product which had been traditionally handled by Iranians, it was the religious establishment which led the people to demonstrate in large numbers against the concession, and eventually led the shah to revoking it. Thus even as early as the late 19^th century the religious leaders of the country were seen as legitimate protectors of Iranian interests from the inefficiency of the government and the meddling of foreign interests.

Muzzafir al-Din Shah followed Nasir al-Din and his policies of economic concessions. His policies, granting foreigners superior custom rates in both the export and import trade, hit the Iranian merchant class hardest. Yet the greatest blow of all came when the government, out of touch with the economic trends of the time, and the fact that it could potentially hold a soon to be vastly important global commodity, sold in 1902 the rights to search for and exploit any potential oil resources in virtually the entire country to a single British subject, William D’Arcy, for a ridiculously low price and share of profits. By WWI the concession had led to the creation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the question of control of Iran’s oil resources greatly shaped developments in the country throughout the 20^th century. At the time of the concession, the Qazar shah proved to its subjects to be not only ineffective, but a blind moron as well.

These all escalated in the Constitutional revolution of 1905. Led by an uneasy coalition of merchants, religious leaders, and an emerging secular intelligencia, the demands of the revolution were met and came to be embodied in what came to be known as the ‘Fundamental Laws’. The laws were drafted by a new class of urban secular elements and certain elements of the clergy- and the new constitutional regime gave bright hopes to modernizing elements in Iranian society for the development of the country, until 1908 when the Russians moved in to destroy it and establish a puppet government of their own. To this day the Constitutional revolution is seen by Iranians as a kind of ‘golden age’ and a heroic time, held to the same level as many other peoples hold their wars and revolutions that led to independence and self-determination.

Two events in Iranian history produced similar positive hopes to Iranians, and both ended with tragically little results. The first was the ejection of the Qazar shahs by the Cossack commander Reza Khan, who went on to consolidate power to himself as Reza shah. Reza Shah was supported by the British who saw him as a potential stabilizing force that could serve British interests. Though he proved difficult to control and to have his own aspirations and reformists tendencies, he served British interests well, by being a ruthless leader with little care for democratization, and not afraid to use force to control his subjects and the clergy. Though he reformed many parts of Iranian life, the changes hardly met the hopes of Iranians or significantly moved the country forward, and he had little success in changing the management of the country’s oil resources. He did manage to renegotiate the terms of the D’Arcy concessions, but the changes were small (the country still only got 20% of oil profits) and AIOC still had a monopoly over the country’s oil resources. In essence to the eyes of many Iranians, AIOC had become a symbol of foreign interference, control and arrogance. It functioned as a state within a state in the areas where it worked exerting full governance and control, and showed little interest or inclination in negotiating with the government. The changes in the terms of the concession came after a lengthy 3 year negotiating period, during which AIOC made it obvious it was not interested in significant changes and more fair terms.

The second significant event in Iranian history was the brief rule as prime minister of Muhammad Mosaddiq from 1951 to 1953. First though it is of interest to examine the environment in which Muhammad Reza Shah took the throne in 1941 from his father Reza Khan. Raised to succeed his father, the new shah had little contact or knowledge of the problems of common Iranians. Moreover, he came to rule at a time when the territorial integrity and sovereignty of his nation was once again violated by foreign powers. Though it declared neutrality during WWII, this was never respected by the allied powers, which took over the country and divided it in spheres of influence between the British and USSR, much as they had in the late 19^th to early 20^th century. The trans-Iranian railway, a symbol of Iranian unity, was completely taken over for the interests of the Soviets and the British, as was in effect the entire infrastructure of the country. When Muhammad Reza Shah came to power, the various elements which had been oppressed during his fathers’ reign sought to reassert themselves, empowered by a common hatred of foreign influence in Iran.

It is also in this light that we must view the rise of Muhammad Mosaddiq. A curious figure in that he was born in aristocracy, Mosaddiq had a reputation as a powerful supporter of the democratization and sovereignty of Iran who had participated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905. He was placed under house arrest for his objection to Reza shah’s authoritarianism and was known as being honest and completely incorruptible. He managed to bring together elements from all sectors of Iranian life, from the secular intellectuals to the clergy, to Marxist and non-Marxist reformers, and from the merchant classes to everyday people. It was the oil issue which led to his rise in official power as prime minister. By this point in time AIOC had become a huge power itself in Iran, having full control over the oil rich parts of the country, building its own company city with its own unique laws, negotiating and hiring its own security force from local tribes, and giving all administrative and managerial positions to British subjects, hiring Iranians only as unskilled laborers. AIOC had come to represent Iran’s relationship with Europe and the West- quoting Dr. Cleveland’s ‘History of the Modern Middle East’:

“Cultural disrespect, economic domination, and imperial manipulation characterized Europe’s relationship with Iran for much of the century leading up to 1950… Iran, although never a colony or protectorate was nonetheless denied its sovereignty throughout the first half of the 20^th century. From the disadvantageous concessions granted by the Qajar shahs to the unfavorable oil agreement signed by Reza shah in 1933, Iran’s economic development was placed largely in the hands of European entrepreneurs; from the Russo-British invasion in 1914 to the Soviet-British occupation of 1941, Iran’s independence was violated whenever it suited European Great Powers to do so. Virtually all sectors of Iranian society resented the prominent role played by foreigners, whether they were Soviet engineers, British oil experts, or US military advisers. Many Iranians also directed their discontent at their monarchs, who had allowed foreign domination in the first place.”

The government had attempted to renegotiate revisions to the oil concessions in 1940. In 1950 the revisions were brought to the majlis (Iran’s constitutional assembly formed during the Constitutional revolution in 1905, but nonetheless holding little power after the Russian 1908 invasion, and during Reza Shahs’ autocratic rule), where they were opposed by Mosaddiq and his National Front coalition. The National front, organized demonstrations and popular uprisings to bring support for their cause, and in the midst of massive popular appeal, invited Mosaddiq in 1951 to take the role of Prime Minister. Mossadiqs’ had two primary goals. First, to bring back into effect the Fundamental laws of 1905 and limit the powers of the shah, creating a democratic system in Iran. And secondly, to nationalize AIOC Iranian operations, a long held goal of Iranian reformers, being a move of both great economic and symbolic significance, which met with massive popular support.

Mosaddig met stiff British resistance. AIOC called on the international community to boycott Iranian oil, and Britain complied, blocking oil shipments out of the country. Mossadiq also met with the opposition from the shah, pro-loyalists, and the Shah’s new allies, the United States. Mossadiq received a ruling placing the armed forces in the hands of the government rather than the shah, shrunk the military, and purged the officer corps. He also produced a land reform law, which would reform the vast royalist land wealth Reza Shah had accumulated during his autocratic rule. In short, Mossadiq wished to replace the power of the monarch with that of constitutional law, and make the army answerable to the government rather than the shah.

Uncompromising on the nationalization issue though, the oil boycott severely limited the income of Mosaddiqs government and weakened it. Both in order to aid their royal ally, and in order to prevent leftist groups such as the Iranian Tudeh party from gaining power as the National Front weakened, the United States in 1953 sent CIA agents to organize a coup with royalist elements and the support of the shah. Following the coup, which succeeded in overthrowing Mosaddiq, the shah, determined not to find himself in the same circumstances that nearly cost him his power, rebuild relations with the West, compromised on the oil nationalization issue, and was given massive military aid from the United States to build his security forces. The National Front and the Tudeh party were both disbanded, their leaders imprisoned, and ever since 1953, the shah dealt ruthlessly with any possible political opponent that might have arisen against him. Quoting again from Dr.Cleveland:

“In order to prevent the reemergence of organized opposition, the shah, with assistance from US and Israeli advisers, established an internal security organization, SAVAK, that became notorious for its pervasive surveillance operations and its brutal treatment of the political prisoners who packed Iran’s jails. From 1953 to 1979 political freedom did not exist in Iran. Although there were periods when limited expression was permitted, the overall picture was one of repression, manipulation and coercion. Election to the majlis were controlled, and the two party system the shah adopted to provide the appearance of democracy was so tightly restricted that Iranians referred to the two organizations as the ‘yes’ and the ‘yes sir’ parties.”

Thus it was that once again Iran’s chances for reform and true democratic change were crushed. It was until 1963 when the next sign of resistance towards the shah and authoritarianism emerged, when a fiery preacher, ayatollah Khomeini started preaching against the shah and his US allies. Khomeini was arrested by SAVAK in 1963 and exiled in 1964. News of his arrest in 1963 sparked wide-spread popular demonstrations in Tehran and other cities, which were violently and forcefully crushed at the cost of possibly thousands of lives.

And so it was that Iran moved on until 1979. The shah announced his plan for reform, known as the ‘White Revolution’, which aimed to modernize the country, though at the same time made no challenges to the institution of the monarchy or his own absolute rule. Though the White Revolution did bring about changes it hardly fulfilled the hopes and aspiration of the Iranian people. Thus in 1978 to 1979, again the shared hatred of the shah and his Western allies from fundamentally different groups -from leftists to merchants, and from the clergy to the intellectual middle class- led to revolt. The beginnings of the uprising occurred when a small band of students and merchants demonstrated against a government-newspaper’s extreme attack against Khomeini. The government response led to casualties, and the clergy, using Islamic tradition called the Iranian people to attend mosque services on the 40^th day after the passing of the dead, thus framing resistance against the shah in an Islamic framework that gave them authority over it. In the 40^th day, peaceful demonstrations were carried out against the government, and again the response led to casualties, and a renewed call for attendance at the 40^th day later. Again demonstrations were held, and once again some turned violent, leading the clergy to call for a third commemoration again, at the 40^th day. This coincided with the shah enforcing a new economic policy to fight inflationary pressures by freezing the economy, freezing wages, canceling government projects and other operations. This led to massive unemployment amongst the urban working classes, many of them recent migrants from rural areas and more susceptible to the message of the Islamic leaders of the anti-government movement. This time the mass of the working classes joined the students and merchants against the government, leading the shah to declare martial law, and ban all demonstrations. His law was ignored, and in September 8, Tehran exploded in demonstrations. The government reacted with force leading to hundreds of death, in a day that has come to be known in Iran as ‘Black Friday’. The response drove the huge mass of people into the camp of Khomeini, and forced even the secular reformists to endorse him to retain their legitimacy. Massive strikes followed, and the revolution reached its zenith in the 10 days of the Muharram, a religious ceremony in the Shiite calendar. Starting on December the 2^nd, thousands of protesters defied the government ban on demonstrations and took to the streets, denouncing the shah, the US, and demanding Khomeini’s return. An estimated 700 were left dead after the initial response, in the first 3 days of the Muharram, but demonstrations continued still, until the 12^th of December where more than 2 million marched in Tehran against the shah. At the same time, the military complex of the shah was crumbling. Soldiers, shocked at the constant violence against students and civilians turned against their officers and joined the demonstrators. In January the 16^th, the Shah facing enormous pressure left the country in self-exile, dying a year later. Ayatollah Khomeini returned in triumph, leader of an unarmed revolution that had toppled the king of kings.

The Islamic republic of Iran that was founded had specified goals both for its internal and external policy. Externally, it called for wide-spread Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East similar to what had occurred in Iran. It was this call, feared by both the powerful dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the United States, that led Saddam to invade Iran and spark one of the longest and bloodiest wars of the 20^th century. The extensive support of the United States, first for the shah, and then for Saddam Hussein only solidified in the minds of the Iranians the view that the foreign, US led community, was against them and cared nothing for freedom or democracy. However the war did in effect halt Iran’s ambitions for spreading the Islamic revolution.

Internally, the goal of the Islamic Republic was to create a social welfare state similar to Sweden, but based on Islamic principles. Yet despite Iranian hopes and efforts, this didn’t come to pass, as no agreement could be found between the various elements of society and the government over exactly what those Islamic principles were and how they could be reflected in political and economic policy. Thus despite the initial hopes of the revolution, the people of Iran today still find themselves embittered by their governments, having failed to achieve their goals, aspirations, and dreams of greatness and revival.

There are a number of major misconceptions in the West regarding Iran, born out of a consistent and powerful media and government misinformation campaign. First of all, Iran is not a dictatorship. It is a constitutional democracy. It is true that there exists a council of Guardians, headed by the ayatollah, which oversees the Islamic nature of the state according to the constitution. That can be seen in effect though as a parallel to the US supreme court, whose job it is to ensure that the government operates according to the constitution of the state. Admittedly the West may not like the Islamic nature of the Iranian constitution, but it a legitimate document with Iranian sources and popular support. Also it is true that the council of guardians has to approve a candidate for him to run in the elections. Yet in practice, the council and the ayatollah rarely interfere in everyday policy, and have not completely stopped elements with contrary views to their own from participating in the elections and even governing the country. The number of clergy in the parliament has also consistently been falling since 1979, reaching about 1/3 by 2000.

This is not to say that Iran is a paradise of freedom and democracy. Though it is as described, a constitutional democracy, its constitution is thoroughly theocratic in nature. The democratic system therefore has to function within the confines of constitutionally established religious parameters. It is true thus that many reformist laws were watered down or blocked by the council of guardians in the late 90s.   Though elements of disagreement with the status quo have been allowed to participate in politics, at the same time, political bullying has not stopped. Especially up to the 90s political imprisonment and torture was common, and more recently, a reformist trend of the late 90s has been reversed, with newspapers and voices of opposition either censored or silenced. At the same time it is true that at times, in matters of national emergency or very big policy decisions, the ayatollah has made his opinion known, after which it is impossible to act in a different way. Still, the country is free enough that Iranians are not afraid to express dissent and disapproval, or demonstrate for causes they believe in. Thus is modern Iran a curious mixture between tolerance and democracy, and monolithic religious conservatism and authoritarianism.

The error of US policy though is in its philosophy, as evidenced in the Iraq war- that it can remove ‘undemocratic regimes’ and that ‘democracy’ will spring up in their place. In the case of Iran, the US hard-line rhetoric, and its opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, rather than helping to serve open up the country and weaken the religious class, has the opposite results. By seeing the US opposing its ambitions, and acting as a proxy for serving Israeli aims, Iranians see once again a foreign influence which for decades had destroyed the country’s democratic ambitions, attempting to stop Iran from strengthening itself and achieving a strong position in the world. It was US and Israeli operatives which formed SAVAK, and now once again, it is the US doing the work of Israeli which is trying to hold the country back, while at the same time displaying the utmost hypocrisy by allowing Israel to arm itself extensively with a nuclear arsenal. The US has shown the upmost of arrogance by labeling Iran’s revolutionary guard, symbol of the revolution, as ‘terrorists’, while it accuses it of being a ‘terrorist’ and ‘theocratic state’ because it supports groups which Iranians, rightly or wrongly, see as fighting a just cause against the same enemies as they did in 1979.

Iran does not need an external power to school it in democracy. The Iranian people have many times in their history resisted violent and autocratic regimes- first in 1905, then in 1951, in 1963, and 1979. They have a long history of secular and intellectual movements fighting for democracy and sovereignty, and resisting the political control of the government by autocratic elements. It is ironic that those opportunities in which Iran was most likely to take a more secular path to democratization were destroyed by the West, while the circumstances which allowed for the Islamic clergy to gain power were created, again, by Western powers. As such, the policy of the West as regarding Iran has been a total and complete failure- it has lost control of its oil resources, helped in forming an Iranian environment completely hostile to it, and supplied it with a huge mass of military equipment originally given to the shah, and ending up in the hands of an Islamic state that hates it. It mirrors an overall disastrous Middle Eastern policy of the last 50 years which has created hatred towards any Western values, reinforced Islamic fundamentalism, and supported tyrants and dictators.

As a new generation of Iranians which never lived through the 1979 revolution and the years of the shah’s regime rises up, well educated, uneasy, and with its own dreams and ambitions, the worst thing the US can do is give them new reasons to distrust secular values, and show the West as arrogant and caring only for its own interest. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and the dropping of any pretensions of a spreading Islamic revolution, Iran has been taking small steps in opening itself up and allowing foreign ideas into it. The Iranian people are perfectly capable of promoting democracy in their country themselves and have historically proved so. In light of the prospects of an Obama presidency, I feel the US has a unique chance to mend relations with Iraq. Being an African American, a community also seen as traditionally oppressed by status-quo powers in the US, a president Obama could receive some degree of positive skepticism if he communicates with Iran in good faith and without the hostility of past administrations. Though history leaves as little hope, it is to the best interests of the US to rethink its policies and approaches.

Notes:

1) This analysis has been based and has been reliant on two sources:

The work of Professor R.Stephen Humphreys from (Humphreys, 2005), ‘From Imperialism to New World Order’, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age,2005 edition University of California Press, Los Angeles.

And the work of Professor William L. Cleveland for (Cleveland, 2004), A history of the Modern Middle East, 3^rd edition, Westview Press, Oxford.

Both books are excellent and I highly recommend them for anybody truly interested in understanding Middle Eastern dynamics.