Information, democracy and media manipulation – CBS and the US election

Properly informed citizens are perhaps the most important requirement for a democracy to function properly. If the political system is dependent on the votes of the people, then the people need to be knowledgeable about what and for whom they are voting for. Dictatorial regimes may get by merely by repression of those who would oppose the governing authority- though even in such systems controlling information and using propaganda can play a major role in controlling and subduing the masses.

A democratic system may still function if the people in power control information and educate the people about the issues at hand as they see fit. But that is not how we wish for the system to function- and neither is it the way democracy was conceived of functioning. We expect democratic systems to arrive at conclusions of the true will of the people, on real issues, based on real information, not on imaginary issues based on propaganda spread by those in power.

I have thought of this, and of the role of the media in informing, after catching an incident that occurred in US politics. Presidential candidate John McCain was interviewed by the network CBS, and on a particular question regarding military operation in Iraq, he gave an answer that betrayed a misunderstanding of the timeline of the war. Yet that answer was never aired. Instead the network edited the interview, putting a different answer he had given to another question in its stead, but making it appear that the candidate had given that answer rather than the one he truly had, to the particular question.

The particulars of the question are not important, it is not that which is striking. The important bit is the editing act itself. One would probably claim that media manipulation today is far lesser than what it used to be in decades past when the nations of the world constantly and freely engaged in propaganda and manipulating what their citizens knew without check. And media manipulation in the developed world is probably lesser than what one might expect to see in autocratic regimes in developing nations. But that does not make things any less important.

This is an act of obvious propaganda, and an attempt to fool viewers into misunderstanding the true views of a candidate. All the worse that it has been carried out by a media network whose job is supposedly to inform and educate citizens, and all the worse that it influences election in the most powerful nation on earth. Such phenomena make democracy meaningless. What is the point of people voting for their leaders, if they do not know what they are voting for?

Which brings into mind two questions:

1) How often do media networks engage in this sort of editing?

2) Should there be an outside agent that oversees and punishes networks for such actions?

It is perhaps impossible to truly know the answer to the first question. But the second is interesting to contemplate on. Would a government wish for such an agency to exist, if it meant losing its power to (mis)inform through the media? And if an agency with real power to severely punish existed, it would be controlled by whom? The last one is a very important question. If the power to control what is propaganda and what is not rest on a single actor, that raises great potential dangers for the future- and of one form of information control being exchanged for another.

Perhaps the internet is the answer. The incident was quickly spread through websites, internet forums and youtube. And unlike any outside agency, the internet is not centralized, and not controlled by any single person. Millions of people can monitor the information they get and easily inform others when an obvious falsehood is reported. Yet how much does the internet influence the average voter who may not be familiar with blogging and newsfeeds? Perhaps more people will be influenced by what CBS had originally broadcast, than by the fact that it was proved a lie. And how can one ensure that this type of clever ‘editing’ will be found out- unlike outright lying, there is no outside source of facts to check that what the media presents is the truth.

What I feel will be the solution is when the media is afraid to ‘edit’ the truth for fear of being caught, as has happened with CBS. Right now, the amount of people who will learn of this and be outraged will be small, since so few so closely follow politics through the tools the internet has given us. So there is little for CBS to fear. When more people use the decentralized internet to inform themselves, then will the media be more afraid of distorting. But that requires that the people themselves care enough to inform themselves. Unfortunately informing citizens properly is not the only requirement for well functioning democracies. The citizens need to care about informing themselves first.

Rationality in political speech, memory, and Cypriot national myths – part 1, The taking of Constantinople and life under Ottoman rule

All too often we find the political positions people hold, from the leaders of nations all the way down to our own friends, as irrational and unexplainable. I have critiqued ideologues in the past- and though not everybody rejects all ideologies, most people will find themselves criticizing certain positions- the religious madman, the bloodthirsty war-leader, the racist nationalist.

Yet these positions are often to their holders rational, and they arrive to them through what appears as a logical frame of thinking. Rationality in politics can be a difficult concept to understand. Dr. Stephen Humphreys, whose work I am currently reading has presented one of those common sense ideas that is sometimes more enlightening when presented in its entirety down in writing. We all base our political stances (how we act ourselves and how we judge the actions of others) based on our knowledge of the world- who other people are, what is our role in the world, and how does the world behaves. In that regard, memory is all important, since we judge the world based on what has happened in the past. After all, the state of the world today, and of the people inside it, is nothing if not the consequence of the actions and facts carried out in the past. One, for example, can understand thus a leader of a foreign Middle Eastern nation as an ‘autocratic madman’, based on what one knows of what that leader has done in the past. Without historic memory, one can have no understanding of the reasons why political situations arise and their current nature as a result of that history, and thus cannot have a position on how to respond.

Problems and misunderstandings arise though because the political impressions of most of us are shaped not just by the things that happened in the past that we know have occurred. We are most shaped, firstly by the things that happened in the past which we know nothing about- and more things have happened that we do not know about (and which if we did, our positions today might be different) than we do know about. And secondly, by the things which we do know about, which in reality, just aren’t so.

To all individuals then, based on the historical remembrances they have, their actions are logical and rational, even if to people who share different memories they seem as not. So often the ‘crazy’ leaders of the Middle East as the West likes to imagine them, act in very rational ways, which the West is incapable of understanding (or at least the average observer is) because their historic knowledge of the region is so faulty. Thus there can be found a very clear and well thought out logic in the actions of dictators, from al-Asad to Saddam Hussein. One does not need to agree with those actions- but seeing them as irrational is not only a mistake in understanding, it’s also a mistake in devising policy to respond to them.

At the same time, we find common people devoted to ideas and ideologies that seem rational and apparent to them, but are really only so because the historical memories of these people do not match with reality. People will tend to believe national myths, passed down from their parents, teachers and overall society, and from then on to their own children or students- but all too often, if not always, national myths bear little resemblance with reality. How does one know then when one’s position, whether a national leader, or a common citizen is based on historic reality, or historic myth? The important thing to realize is that to each person, whatever the reality of his worldview, his position is a rational one. From there on, it is important for each one who wishes to truly understand the world, and form positions that match reality and not some imagined history in our heads, to know history and the realities of the past and present, and be able to understand why others arrive at different conclusions through their different experiences.

I wish to consider here some of the myths that have shaped Greek-Cypriot political thought and ideology, ideology which has often led to tragic events, based as it is on a historical reality that never existed. Specifically I want to look at ultra-nationalism, a thought process that has led to violence in the past, and hostility between the different nationalities of the island. This will be covered in a series of post, since the topic is to me an extensive one. Ultra-nationalism to the Greek Cypriots that adhered to it, has emerged in the form of not only pro-Greek sentiment, but also a decidedly anti-Turkish one as well. To the Greek-Cypriot, history has proven that Greeks are strong and noble fighters, who even when outnumbered never give up on their principles, and eventually manage to defeat their oppressors (whether these are British or Turkish). They managed to retain their language and religion even under centuries of a foreign rule which wished to destroy their national identity. Turks on the other hand have been a barbaric and uncultured foreign race that based its empire on the ruins of another greater one (the Byzantine), oppressed the people under its rule and sought to eliminate their culture, religion and sense of identity, and has never achieved anything of note by itself.

As with many national myths, the history of the noble Greek warrior defending his values, and the barbarian Turk (or rather Ottoman, for though the original Ottomans were Turks, and the language of the empire was Turkish, for most of its existence the Ottoman empire was not synonymous with Turkish ethnicity) trying to oppress the people under his rule, has little to do with reality. I will examine a number of commonly held beliefs- and then show the corresponding historical reality.

The taking of Constantinople, and life under Ottoman rule

Let us go as far back as the time of the Byzantine Empire. To the Greeks, Byzantium was a glorious empire of learning and culture, which was conquered by a barbaric and warlike enemy in the form of the Turks- an enemy much more intolerant and violent. Yet this is far from the truth. Byzantium had by the late 6^th century started to enter into its long stage of decline, and into a stage of constant warfare with the Sasanian empire in the East, and later on the Arabs coming from the South. The emperors imposed heavy periodic taxes to finance their military campaigns. Furthermore the empire was extremely religiously conservative. Once Orthodox Christianity was adopted as the imperial religion, the emperors could not tolerate any other religions in their lands. Thus non-Christians, Jews, and non-Orthodox Christians were branded as heretics and systematically persecuted. In this environment, most subjects of the empire welcomed what their new, much more tolerant, initially Arab, (in the case of the lands of what was Greater Syria, Egypt and North Africa), and later on, Ottoman rulers.

Even before the fall of Constantinople, Turkish leaders had adopted the cultural and social lifestyle of the great cosmopolitan Arab cities, which had reached their glory during past Arabian empires. At its peak, the Ottoman Empire was the cultural, intellectual and artistic centre of the world. Moreover they were far more technologically advanced than any either the Byzantine empire, or the kingdoms of Western Europe- it was the use of Turkish gunpowder while their enemies still fought with pikes that enabled them to have such great military victories, and eventually defeat Constantinople. Constantinople itself, weakened as the empire decline, had already been sacked by Western crusaders (the sacking being the definitive turning point towards collapse of the empire) and had by 1453 become a symbol of the crumbling Byzantine Empire – a conservative and bureaucratic entity that had fallen behind the powers of the East and West. When it was taken by the Ottomans in 1453, it was a crumbling city, with a population of less than 50 000. It was under Ottoman rule that the city was repopulated, and it was Ottoman architectural revolutions that gave the city much of its present glory. Unlike popular belief in the Greek-speaking world, it was Byzantium that was by 1453 an unsophisticated, backwards entity, and the Ottomans a strong, cultured people with a finely organized and highly efficient army.

Ottoman rule over its subjects was noted for adaptability, flexibility and pragmatism. Taxes were decidedly lower than they were under the Byzantine empire, and different religions were tolerated, as was the custom for Islamic civilizations of the time, as the Quran demands respect for ‘people of the book’, that is, Jews and Christians. The peoples of different religions were divided into different ‘millets’ or communities, each one granted considerable autonomy and the right to have their own religious leader. Furthermore, the Ottomans were considerably lenient in terms of allowing local practices and customs in their conquered lands. The Ottomans had realized the difficulties of ruling over as large a territory as theirs, and thus were very tolerant in terms of allowing the people under their rule to maintain their local customs and traditions. Completely contradictory to popular misunderstandings of the Greek world, the Ottoman empire was noted for the fact that a large mosaic of cultures and peoples existed within them, with considerable rights granted to them, and governed relatively leniently. A governor who was so harsh as to cause his province to revolt against him was seen as ineffective and impractical.

This is not to say that the Ottoman Empire resembled a modern nation in any sense in terms of humanitarian affairs, but it surpassed contemporary kingdoms and empires of the time, before it itself reached the beginning of its decline and the Western powers begun their ascend. It is also important to note that the concept of nationalism and of commitment to an idea of common ethnicity was a concept that only really emerged after the Middle Ages – before that the political commitments of most people were to the king or emperor rather than any idea of ‘nationality’. Thus the conquests of middle age empires should not be seen with the same lens with which we see today’s aggressions towards sovereign nations. The people of the time had no concepts such as democracy, statehood and nationality.

The remarkable conclusion as regards to Greek national myths, is that there never was any great heroic achievement of managing to maintain their unique identity, culture, and religion through centuries of a foreign Ottoman rule. The remarkable irony is that the Greek people have been played exactly as the policies of the emperors that ruled them dictated, despite modern feelings. The Greeks have got it backwards. It was exactly the policies of tolerance of the Ottoman Empire that allowed Greek identity as it emerged after the fall of Byzantium to maintain itself. Yet what was that identity? It was in fact Byzantine conservatism, intolerance, and prosecution, that did in fact change the character of the Greek people into what is somehow today considered as the ‘natural’ one which survived the Ottomans. Modern strong belief in Greek-Orthodoxy is a direct result of Byzantine prosecution and intolerance. The character which in fact ‘survived’ the Ottoman occupation, and was shaped by Byzantium, is in fact much the opposite of that of ancient Greece. Whereas ancient Greeks were socially and sexually liberal, polytheistic and accepting of other religions, individualistic and independent, open minded, and with more commitment to an idea of the city-state, if not the individual, rather than any concept of nationalism, the identity which emerged after Byzantine rule was a strict monotheistic belief in Greek-Orthodoxy, intolerant of other religions and committed to the church, nationalist, and socially conservative. Thus the Greeks in fact failed to ‘heroically’ maintain their identity. In fact the success of the empire that controlled them was so complete in eradicating said identity, that it was by that time seen as their natural one- though it was the Byzantine and not the Ottoman empire that did so. Hellenistic culture, as is understood the set of cultural values and beliefs which are thought to be the basis of Western society, begun by the Greeks, and followed by the Romans, was in fact eradicated by the advent of a much more conservative monotheistic Christianity (amongst many other external factors of course), and in the case of the Greeks, the Orthodox variety embodied by Byzantium. These values were of course only to re-emerge in the West after the Dark Ages, and especially after the enlightenment, and after the power of the church there was reduced and challenged.

That these ideas and histories, are completely twisted in modern Greek-Cypriot though is not unexpected. Most peoples have their own myths, legends, and attempts to create a sense of national pride and identity in their ‘achievements’ and in their victories against lesser enemies. These concepts are so ingrained in wider society that it is difficult for them to be changed or challenged without being branded an outcast – they are taught in primary schools and passed on as ethnic legends from parents to children. I will continue later on examining Greek-Cypriot national myths, by examining the concept of the Devshirme and the 1821 independence war.

(Humphreys, 2005), ‘From Imperialism to New World Order’, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age,2005 edition University of California Press, Los Angeles.

(Cleveland, 2004), A history of the Modern Middle East, 3^rd edition, Westview Press, Oxford.

The ideological dangers for Palestinians

What is an ideology? To me it is a set of principles, ideas, and concepts, on how certain ideals are to be achieved. Ideals do not equal ideas or ideologies. Ideals are some higher, abstract values that we tend to view as desirable- ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ are just some examples. Ideologies are sets of principles on how to reach these ideals. And though there are a huge number of ideologies in our world today, their followers when questioned, will proclaim to strive for remarkably similar ideals. We thus see the paradox of people who follow almost mutually exclusive ideologies, proclaiming when asked that they both fight to achieve strikingly similar ends.

To me, ideologies are dangerous concepts. Their very nature leads them to be so. Ideologies tend to be both self-contained, and utopist in nature. They are utopist, because if their set of principles and ideas is followed, then, or so their supporters say, the best possible outcome and the upmost prosperity will ensue. And they are self-contained, because their set of principles can encompass any possible situation in which they are relevant- and must always be followed in order to reach the desired, utopic outcome. So in the case of economic ideologies, a pure ideology of free-market capitalism will proclaim than in any economic situation that relates to the allocation of scarce resources, the best possible course of action is to leave the free market completely unregulated to handle the situation- a pure communist ideology would proclaim that it should always be handled by the central planner to ensure equality. But of course, as most modern nations have learned, neither ‘pure’ ideology is always correct. There are certain scenarios where an unregulated free market will produce the best result, there are others in which regulation and government interference is needed. To follow a strict set of principles that guide always to the same end policy attitude, regardless of circumstance, will lead to disaster.

And this is true for political ideologies as well. All too often ideologists proclaim that this or that set of principles will lead to the best state or society. But again, to blindly follow a set of principles in all possible situations, regardless of the individual features of each, will with mathematical precision, lead to disaster. For such an approach treats social matters, such as the state, or the economy, that depend on the functions of human beings, as if they are physical phenomena of the physical rather than the social sciences- and expects that social matters can follow strict, mathematical rules, in which by applying a set of principles, a perfect result can be obtained each time. This is an illogical approach to take. Human beings are not robots- they do not follow strict rules in their behaviors. Therefore the best possible way of managing the affairs of humans, can also not be reliant on strict, self-contained principles.

But ideologies are not only dangerous because in the long run they lead to undesirable outcomes. They are dangerous because they inevitably lead to conflict and violence. If the followers of one ideology see their principles as both leading to a perfect future, and as being the only, complete, and self-contained set of principles that does so, then it makes logical sense to them that those who follow different ideologies or beliefs are enemies, who by their actions lead away from the perfect future. So inevitably, violence erupts between people of different ideologies- even as they proclaim to fight for the same thing. The most dangerous people in the world are not those deemed ‘evil’ by the people who proclaim to themselves be the protectors of freedom. They are those who claim they have the ‘perfect’ solution to the social problems of everybody- as long as everybody accepts this solution and is ‘re-educated’ to it. Given that we are a race of humans, and we cannot be programmed to always follow identical principles, there will always be those with different views. To the pure ideologue those must be removed from society- and inevitably to the ideologue, the state must be ruled by an authoritarian ruler, since democracy, with its swap of power at regular intervals, will not ensure that ideological principles are followed by all, at all times.

What has this meant for the Arab world? The Middle East has unfortunately been an inherently ideologically filled place- Marxism, nationalism, religion, in Turkey’s case, Kemalism, and of course, in the case of Israel, Zionism. These are all ideologies, which at one time or the other were meant to be the saviors of this or that state. And inevitably almost all have failed, and almost all have led to conflict.

Yet before we examine why they have led to conflict, let’s look more closely at the nature of these ideologies. More often than not, ideology in the Middle East has been tied to identity- the idea that if only the peoples of the region could identify themselves as this or that, and the foreign powers of the region be fought off, everything would work off for the best. The two greatest ideological forces in the Middle East can be understood this way- Nationalism (whether Arabic, Iranian, or Turkish) and Religion (whether Islamic, Jewish, or also, in the case mostly of Lebanon, Christian). Both place identity as a central concept of their worldviews, often coupled with some form of socialism and nationalization as an economic backdrop.

In this way ideology in the Middle East has followed a more archaic Germano-Italian version, placing emphasis on matters of identity, and concepts of mutual connection in some higher form between the state citizens, whether that is in race or religion.

And this is exceptionally dangerous, both now and in the past. It is dangerous because, firstly, ideological as it is, it cannot tolerate those who do not accept the identity imposed on them- and thus people who identify themselves differently must fight each other to see whose worldview will prevail, and which character they will enforce on the state. And ‘enforce’ it they will, for in a region of such variability as the Middle East, the only way to ensure a state with a ‘pure’ identity, is through violence and dictatorship against those of a different character – much as the Germans sought to violently impose an ‘Aryan’ nation over Europe. Observe thus the struggle between Islamists and nationalists, or between other groups with different identities- each state often having its own unique conflict. Why was the Lebanese civil war fought, if not because that country clearly identified its political institutions in terms of religious identity- Christian, Sunni or Shiite and the share of power of each? This led to struggle as each faction sought to secure for itself what it felt as its rightful share of power for its own community –communities defined by concepts of identity based on religion. Why do we observe intolerance, both social and religious, conservatism and inflexibility in the states of Iran and Saudi Arabia, if not because of the pre-occupation of those states with maintaining some form of ‘Islamic’ identity? Why did Arab nationalism initially in Syria, Egypt and Iraq lead to leaders who would rule for decades, if not because of their wish to maintain the ideological purity of their states- since with democracy inevitably one who would perhaps lead to a different path might be elected. And has this not inevitably led to conflict with Islamist movements who identified themselves through religion rather than nationalism? Look at the tragic events in Syria when Islamists, clashed with the state- each side ideologically fanatic, and sure that their own principles and identity would lead to some imagined utopia, needing to enforce their views with any means necessary. And of course unfortunately, all too often former ideological leaders end up more obsessed with the power they hold than the principles they originally espoused- so ideological oppression becomes oppression for its own end. But finally, and because this is meant to end up as a discussion on Palestinians, look at what the concept of Zionism, and the idea of a state linked with a racial and religious identity, in this case the Jewish one, has led to. Since the Zionist entity cannot tolerate a state character that is not Jewish, it must first ensure that Palestinians cannot have any real significant presence in the Zionist entity, and secondly ensure they cannot have any strong presence adjacent to it that can one day challenge it.

But secondly, such ideologies based on identity, inevitably do not provide any solutions to real problems, since identity does not actually dictate any governing or state institutions that can lead to a functioning nation. They are, at the end of the day, mere devices for moving the masses that eventually always lead to strife, and do not present any meaningful policy targets in themselves.

This is a danger I always consider when hearing or reading the works of Palestinian activists, or see the realities in Palestine. I see a lot of preoccupation with the idea of ‘Palestinian nationality and ethnicity’ and how this has been denied to Palestinians, how this defines their right to a state, and how this has been denied to them. And on the other hand I see a great focus placed by other parties on the role of religion, and the need for Palestinians to identify with that as the source for struggle and the character a future state must take. A classic dichotomy, seen elsewhere in the Middle East, of nationalists and religious believers.

To me this is a wrong frame of mind for Palestinians to fall into. Rather than the Germano-Italian model, with its focus on identity, Palestinians should adopt the Franco-American model. It is understandable why they would be hesitant to do so, given the negative role France, the UK, and the USA have played on the region. Nevertheless, this is the correct course of action for them to take. Franco-American ideas dictate to us, that what is important is not identity, or a monolithic ideology. Indeed these concepts are discouraged. The institutions of governance do not form themselves once the people adopt a certain identity. Rather, it is the institutions which must first be formed, that ensure a state entity that can function by itself, and then ideologies and identities are accepted as equal inside the state. So in a state with a Franco-American model, the state is formed, secular, democratic, and non-ideological in nature, and the people have equal rights of participation and citizenship under it, whatever their religious, ethnic, or ideological identities. People debate on the merits of how best to govern the state, and governance passes from people of different ideas to others through the democratic process- as long as the equality of citizenship regardless of identity is honored. No ‘ideology’ as such exists that has the solution to all possible problems. People recognize that different problems require different approaches, and it is for this reason that governance passes from one party to the other through time, each with its own approaches. To some ideologues this approach may seem problematic- they need to believe that there can be one perfect set of principles that will inevitably and with mathematical precision lead to what they see as utopia. The idea that problems can be seen each as a unique one, solved with ad hoc principles is unappealing to them. Yet if human history and human psychology should have taught us anything, it is that this approach is the only one that can lead to development, prosperity, and the end of conflict.

In such a model, each individual has the right of self-determination and equal citizenship in his land and state regardless of his identity. Thus the crime to Palestinians has not been that they deserve a state because they are a unique ‘nationality’, and that this has been taken from them. It has been that the right of self-determination of each individual Palestinian has been taken from them, their right to govern themselves stolen, and policies enforced upon them by a third power, Great Britain and the Zionists in the years of the mandate. Rather than being given the right to govern their selves and dictate their own policies, another state, whose policies where dictated by others, was forcefully created on their land. Not only was the creation of this state an act that violated the rights of self-determination of Palestinians, they do not even have the right of participation in this state, exactly due to discrimination because of their identity. This is an important concept to remember, and I will come back to it later.

Unfortunately for one people to accept the ideas I present, there needs to be an acceptance of certain principles often missing in the Middle East. If a democratic secular state, with equality regardless of identity, and the rights of self-determination, secured, is to be formed, then all parties must accept that if their side loses the democratic electoral process they will always have a chance to try again next time- and that the opposition will not attempt to hold on to power indefinitely. But in the ideological nature of the Middle East these principles have often been missing- since each party feels its principles to be ideal, all too often the winners are unwilling to relinquish power, and the losers unwilling to accept defeat. But democracy cannot function in such a system. I do actually believe the Palestinians to be more mature than this- the excellent way in which the Palestinian elections took place gives reason for hope. But how would the actors in a Palestinian state behave?

It is easy to understand why some Palestinians would be preoccupied with ideas of ideology and identity. Such concepts, with their all-encompassing ideas and grand promises, make for great rhetoric, and are easy to enflame and drive the people into action, especially a people which has faces as much injustice as the Palestinians. Nevertheless, their inevitable results are not desirable, and neither are they helpful in the struggle against Zionism.

First of all, ideologies divide the people, and inevitably harm the fight. If Palestinians are made to believe that one or the other ideology is the one that will inevitably lead them to salvation, they will also, inevitably, be led to pre-occupation with trying to enforce their ideology, or convince other Palestinians of the righteousness of their principles. Thus, rather than focusing on real action against the occupation, Palestinians will waste their time preaching Islamism, nationalism, or socialism, and be divided into separate camps each with their own agendas, part of it being to fight the ideologies of the other. Truth be told, the greatest mistake of the Palestinians has been their division and lack of a cohesive, long-term policy. All too often in the past, one group in Palestine has been working against the goals of the other. Yet, to me, how much more beneficial would it have been to the Palestinians to accept a common cause and equality in the Palestinian entity whatever the identity and ideological leaning of each individual. To go about forming institutions of governance and representation of the popular will, institutions which would have ensured a single representative of the Palestinian people, with its leadership decided by the popular democratic process with each Palestinian having an equal say whatever his personal worldview, and the authority to dictate long term political policy originating from a mandate of the Palestinian people. Not only would this give Palestinians authority in the international stage, and create an actor that can represent the people in international institutions, it would ensure the healing of rifts in the Palestinian community, for each party would know they would have a new chance to convince of their positions in the next electoral cycle of the democratic process. It would also proclaim to the world ‘Look, we are one entity and one people, ready to govern themselves, we have created democratic institutions ourselves, accepting of each other’s differences, and discriminating against none’. As things stand now, the world will be worried, that even if a Palestinian state was to be formed through negotiation with one actor, another would never accept that. Of course, as any Palestinian would tell me, did they not do just that in their elections leading to the Hamas victory, proclaimed by all observers as fair, and was it not the international community – or rather the USA with Israel- that did not accept the result? True, but it has been a course of action that took far too long to take place. And one in which the Palestinians should stay true despite the actions of outside actors. It is understandable to understand the struggles of Palestinians when their elected representatives are deemed as ‘unacceptable’ by outside actors. But that should not drive them back to partisanship.

If ideological loyalty persists then that would raise serious questions for the potential of a Palestinian state. Would it be one of equal citizenship regardless of identity, and where the security of passover of governance is secured- which would give an incentive to all actors to participate in the state? Or would it quickly degenerate into a state of a singular party or leader, enforcing a single ideology and identity, like so many other Middle Eastern states?

But finally, a focus on ideology and identity, justifies Israel’s existence and policies- specifically focus on nationalist ideology. If Palestinians proclaim that they deserve a state due to their national or ethnic identity, then would that not imply that Jews should as well? And given that there was no particular historic area in which Jews where a majority in the start of the 20^th century, such an attitude would justify the Zionist goal of creating a uniquely Jewish state in the lands of another people- as that would be the only way for a Jewish state to exist.

This is not a legitimate frame of thinking. Nationality is not a real entity to have rights and demands to a state, it is rather a construct of the human mind. It is individuals who are real and who have the right to citizenship, equality, representation and self governance in their host states and lands, regardless of their national or religious identity. The problem of anti-semitism in Europe was not that there was no Jewish state, but that Jews were discriminated in their states exactly due to their identity, rather than sharing in equal representation and citizenship. And similarly, the crime of Zionism was that it engaged in exactly the sort of action that anti-semites and Nazis had in Europe- striving for an ‘ethnically-clean’ state, where those of a different nationality would be driven out and where people would be judged in terms of their identity. Even worse, the Zionist project would create such a state in a land in which Jews had no real significant historic presence, enforcing itself through a colonialist project at the expense of the wishes of that area’s legitimate inhabitants. The real objective and goal for Jewish leaders should have been to strive for equality and the ending of discrimination in their host states, and the powers of the West should have similarly honored the right of Palestinians to self-governance in their own land, rather than forcing them out for the creation of a racist Jewish state. Zionist leaders would proclaim that equality in Europe could never be reached, and that WWII proved this. But that was the only possible moral course of action, and in fact, the Jews who remained in Europe and have over the years achieved equality prove exactly the opposite. In the end, the forming of Israel was nothing more than a victory for Nazi principles who sought to judge the state and the individual in terms of race and nationality, and discriminate and oppress those of different identities. Yet, if Palestinians themselves accept the logic that ‘nationalities’ deserve states, and base the legitimacy of their fight on the fact that as ‘Palestinians’, they deserve a state, then they justify the type of logic that Israel has been using in the formation of its policies all along.

Only a rejection of ideology, and an acceptance of the values of equality regardless of one’s beliefs can lead to successful nation states, and can unite people of different worldviews into a common goal. Ideology and the emotional empowerment it can give to people under oppression are unquestionable. After all, most major revolutions against injustice were carried out by highly ideological movements. Yet inevitably, if the new states they create follow the same purely ideological character, they lead to failure, rather than security, prosperity, and development. Neither Iran’s Islamism, Israel’s Zionism, or Egypt’s Arabic nationalism have ended in prosperous, secure states. Revolution should instead be carried out with a rejection of ideology and based on the values of liberty, freedom of thought, religion, and freedom to hold whatever political beliefs one wishes.

One would argue to me now that what I am describing now is an ideology itself- secularism is an ideology they would say, as is democracy and focus on liberty. They are sets of principles that dictate how to reach the ideals of humanity. Yet they would be wrong. Whereas ideologies say that one must follow ‘this and this principle’ to achieve a goal, secularism and democracy say exactly the opposite. If there is a principle in secular democracies, it is that there exist no absolute principles. It is the idea that any individual can hold whatever religious positions he wants, and that any political view is acceptable, as long as individuals accept the rights of others to hold their own positions, and accept the passing of political power through the democratic process. Secularism and democracy are not dictates of a particular set of ideas- they are the acceptance of ALL sets of ideas. It is however important to note, that both secularism and democracy are needed for a well-functioning state. Many dictators in the Middle East have claimed to be secular in that they do not link the state with any religion, yet they most certainly are not democratic. Religious freedom has to be linked with political freedom for true liberty to be created, and the functioning of the democratic institutions that allow citizens to select the policies of their states, and give them the freedom to change those policies through time to achieve the best solutions for any particular set of circumstances over time.

These ideas where passing through my head today as I was reading a posting at this link http://palestinethinktank.com/2008/07/11/adel-samara-why-the-socialist-solution-in-palestine/ on how ‘socialism’ is the ‘solution’ for Palestinians (and socialism not in the sense in which Europeans use the term, but in its purer, more archaic form). I could not find myself agreeing with that particular article. Inevitably I do not wish to give a lengthy rebuttal, just my key, fundamental points for disagreement, for they are fundamental The writer originally argues that striving for a ‘single’, secular state is acceptance of the Zionist crimes against Palestinians, in that it asks Palestinians to integrate with the Zionist entity. This to me, is a completely illogical view. Zionism, by definition, believes in the existence of a ‘Jewish’ state- all the injustices and oppressive policies of Israel have been based on a goal of ensuring the existence of such a state, and that Palestinians could not have the power to challenge it. Yet secularism, again by definition, requires a state that is the exact opposite of what the Zionist state is- one which accepts equality of all citizens regardless of religion or identity. If the Zionist state was to be replaced by a secular one, that would in fact mean that the entire policy set of Israel, and the principles onto which it was founded, are rejected and discredited. To claim that creation of a single secular state somehow justifies Zionism, seems to me either a misunderstanding of what Zionism, or secularism are, or otherwise, that I am missing the details of what supporters of a secular state propose (perhaps there are some that advocate Palestinian integration into the Jewish state of Israel as is as a solution to the problem, and as a ‘secular’ state?). Note that I do not advocate a single state solution over a two-state solution, or the opposite- I believe a single, secular state solution would be best, if possible, but that a two-state solution is more realistically possible.

The writer then goes on to follow with the rhetoric similar it seems to me of advocates of all ideologies- that only through the following of this particular set of principles, by this ideology, can the struggle against the Zionist entity truly be won, and an ‘ideal’ future be achieved. A list of actions is given, prescribed by these principles, the only ones which can lead to true justice- many of them to my mind absurd, like the call to nationalize all industry in Israel, especially all high-tech industry, a move that would lead to economic disaster. The question with this type of ideological purity is of course, what do you do with people like me, who would not accept those principles, and see them as leading to disaster? What do you do with the even more fanatical followers of other ideologies, like Islamists, who see their principles as divinely justified? Since to the ideologue his principles are ‘the only way’ to achieve his utopist ideals, obviously all those who hold different values must be held in check.

At the same time, socialism and focus on nationalization of industries and land reform are certainly not a new concept in the Middle East or around the world. They were tried in Nasser’s Egypt, in the early years of Baathist Syria and Iraq, even in Iran. In all cases, pure socialism has failed to bring economic or social prosperity- for the reason I explained in the start of this piece when judging pure communism with pure free markets.

Even more so, the worst part to me of the piece comes relatively early, when the writer lists the step for the socialist solution in Palestine. Key to the solution: ‘educating Palestinians’ to see how their interests lie with the socialist ideology. Thus of course follows the logic of all who start with good intentions and inevitably end as tyrants and dictators- their way of thinking is the best, if only the people can be made to understand that. Thus people must be ‘educated’ as to what their interests are, and all be made to accept a single set of principles. An attitude that goes directly against democracy, and ensures a future of conflict, war, oppression and violence, when inevitably, not everybody accepts this perfect ideology- a future that will justify the harsh measures the dictator to be will enforce to ensure that opposing ideological elements are held in check, and his unwillingness to relinquish political power.

There will be those now that will attack me: ‘How can you be so harsh on the ideology of socialism, when obviously by doing so you support the opposite, a ‘capitalist’ ideology’? But of course I am doing no such thing! You can be sure that I am just as harsh on those on the far right who advocate and propose that everything is privatized and everything left for the free market to handle, with no regulating or overseeing at all. The problem is, there actually exist no nations which follow a purist capitalist ideology! Even in the United States, as one of my favorite economists, John Kay, paraphrasing, has written, the US economy shows little resemblance to the capitalist model espoused by advocates of the, so they call it, ‘American economic model’. Indeed, if you were to make a list of all the governmental social service and good provisions in the US, and all the ways in which the government interferes in the free market economy, and present it to American supporters of this model without naming the country, they would probably be amazed that a nation with such ‘obvious socialist tendencies’ even exists.

The reality is that advanced economies and developed nations do not base their economies and policies on pure ideological models. All of them have mixed models, with some form of a free market economy with intervention and regulation. In all the developed nations, governance is not based on following a strict ideological path- policies are not based on always following a set of concrete ideological principles which define what said policies should be. They are instead based on a number of approaches and a mixture of principles, and the passing of government from one party to another, each with their own approach to problem solving, through the democratic process, ensures this. The writer of the piece asks at some point- how do the people of in the West know anyway that the ‘capitalist model’ is the best for them, and that there cannot exist a better choice? The answer to that of course, is that the people of these nations do not follow any one single model- when they are disappointed with the results they get, they vote a new government in with different approaches and different policies. There certainly exist both socialist and communist parties in Europe, and they have existed for a long time. They have been participating in the democratic process, and attempting to convince of their views, and many times socialist parties have held power. Why then is it that the people do not always vote in socialists, having experienced the policies they bring, if the socialist model is one that would produce better results than the ‘capitalist model’? The same question can of course be asked regarding the parties at the other end of the political spectrum. The answer, as should by now be obvious, is because there exists no perfect models, ideologies and principles, so for the people of democratic states who have the power to change their governments, different approaches are adopted for different situations all the time. And as already explained, the reason no perfect model exists is not because it has not yet been thought of or adopted. It is because of the fundamental nature of social sciences and of the human race that they study, their nature as creatures which cannot be described in mathematical rules and strict principles, and show little resemblance to robotic automatons which can produce optimal results by following optimal rules.

All ideologies inevitably lead to disaster- their very nature dictates that with mathematical precision, for all ideologies inevitably cannot co-exist with people of differing views. Ideologues and intellectuals unfortunately all too often spend far too much of their time attempting to prove that this or that is the ideology that we should all adopt. Yet neither ideologues nor intellectuals are a new phenomenon- should not the modern ones be troubled by the fact that the very types of ideological promotion they are now engaged in has been done time and time again by others in the past, promoting again, each their own version of utopian perfection- and that none has given us what has been promised? Has not the Middle East suffered enough under people such as this, who have led their people and their nations on wild experiments and decades of stagnation and conflict?

Only democracy and secularism, and security of equality regardless of identity or political positioning, can ensure that a state can exist peacefully and without internal strife.

How International bodies have become a waste of time and money

Gordon Brown hails the success of the G8 summit and the progress made as regards to the issue of climate change, read headlines in the BBC today and around the British media. The progress mentioned? The G8 countries will ‘consider and adopt’, in an ‘international agreement’, the goal of reducing carbon emissions by 50% by 2050. There’s no real concrete plan of how this would be achieved of course, or any meaningful policy- though Gordon Brown tells us they have ‘discussed’ specific measures, which I guess is something. Still. Last year, the G8 countries could only agree to ‘seriously consider’ setting a goal for carbon emissions, so a year later, moves have been made forward. Apparently the G8 can now agree that something needs to be made about Global Warming, rather than seriously consider doing it, and have realised there are such things as alternative fuels that can be a fun topic for discussion in a supposedly top international summit. A couple of years down the lint, and they will be able to ‘formalise’ their ‘agreement to the goal’ in some form of document, and who knows, a decade later they might actually come up with actual policy on how to act on that goal.

An onserver might answer back that it is not the job of the G8 to set up policy- rather it is the job of individual nations, and thus, even if no real progress comes from the G8, the individual nations themselves have concrete plans of action (-if only-). But then, what is the point of having a G8 summit at all, if it produces neither real coordination among its member nations, each one going its own way, nor real proposals relevant to the decision making processes of the member nations?

This is not to meant to be a singular attack on the G8 summit itself though, as if that is the only inefficient institution around. Let’s look at the most spectacular example of reduntance and inefficiency, the United Nations. The UN is incapable of acting or enforcing any sort of action or policy in all the areas where doing so actually matters. If the UN was created to solve international problems, conflicts and disputes, it seems to have the remarkable ability of only being effective in the cases where the actors involved are in agreement of what they want from the UN- whereas wherever any actual dispute exists its authority crumbles. The Security Council is incapable of agreeing on anything of importance- and as far as ‘UN resolutions’ are concerned, they might as well never be issued, since nobody really follows them anyway. Not to say that the UN doesn’t carry out a lot of functions, give aid, carry out peacekeeping operations and produce some interesting analyses and reports. But all its actions are either uncontroversial in that everybody can agree with them, or minor in that they have no real effect on how a conflict develops. As an actual tool for shaping and stopping conflicts, and solving problems around the world it fails dramatically.

But much can also be said of the recent ineffectiveness of the IMF, the international court of justice, and to a certain extend the EU – which though capable of forming and enforcing policy, seems too bureaucratic, inflexible and incapable of quickly reaching concensus quickly.

International institutions have been formed to oversee the economic and national actors of the world- that is, the actions of nations and, in our modern world, globalised firms. Yet as we observe, they are incapable of exerting any form of governance on either. And for that, we can blame two factors. Their lack of authority, and their inflexibility.

The issue of authority has already been examined to a degree. Even when a decision or policy is made, how does the international body enforce it? The example I have in mind here is that of the ‘UN resolution’, that elusive decision which is almost never actually followed. The problem is a very real and practical one. The UN simply has little power to enforce its will, no real offensive military might for enforcing decisions. One might argue that that is the role of NATO, but that seems so dominated by the US, that it begs the question of whether it is the will of an ‘international’ body at all that is being enforced. Regardless, one hardly imagines NATO enforcing UN resolutions on Israel, North Korea, or Russia. If especially in the cases of major conflicts involving significant powers, international bodies have no authority, what is their reason for existance at all?

The second issue is that of flexibility, and one might argue this is related to authority as well. Nations usually have the ability to adapt and change over time. Some have in build democratic institutions that ensure changing governments and thus policies and attitudes. Others, even if more autocratic and dictatorial, are nevertheless forced to change in reaction to the world around them, or the social forces inside them. In the case of economic actors, such as globalised firms, change, in operations, strategies, and functions, occurs at an increasingle rapid speed, which is only growing faster as global competition and the need for constant adaptation increases. Yet as far as the UN and the G8 are concerned, the world might as well just have defeated Hitler and have as its main concern the rebuilding of Europe. What is the point of a Security Council or a G8 in a modern world that does not include China for example? The paradox is pointed out all the time, yet none of these institutions show any sign of reform- and with a multitude of member nations in them, it is unlikely that they can easily reach a concensus on what kind of reform they would need anyway. But if international institutions cannot adapt to a rapidly chaning world, how can they have the relevant authority to govern it?

Some will argue that international bodies are not needed in any case and both nations and economic actors should be left free to act on their own. But such views are misguided. WWII did indeed teach us that an institution such as the UN is needed, as should all the rest of 20th century conflicts after WWII which should have been avoided or found avenues of being resolved through the UN, had it actually operated the way it should. As for economic actors, it is fair to say that supporters of a position which demands they have no governance acted on them, are the type of armchair economists who have little knowledge of why their economy (for they really only come from the US economy) has actually been succesful. It is not my goal here to make a critique of ultra-liberal economics -that would be too large a subject- so I will leave it by saying that given that no market is perfect (and that is most certainly true for international, cross-border markets), some form of governance is needed.

So how can international bodies be made to be more effective? Whatever proposals one makes, we would run into the problem of actually implementing them in multi-member bodies, each with its own ideas, and ultimately unlikely to reach concensus between them. If this problem was surpassed,then national elected leaders would need to find a way to reform our international institutions, and in such a way that constant revision and change is build into them- for a one off change now would mean a form unsuitable 20 years down the line. The task would not be easy. I initially wished to express suggestions of my own, but after beginning to write them down I realised how they would, infact, be non-functional, if not disastrous themselves. It after all easier to criticise something than to make real suggestion on how to solve it…

A history of political Iran, and why US policy towards it is wrong.

A brief history of political Iran¹

Why have Middle Eastern political realities evolved the way they have? The people of the Middle East have had ambitions and anxieties concerning independence, autonomy and statehood entering the 20^th century, despite popular misconceptions which see them as unsophisticated and unaware or uncaring of such subjects until the last few decades. Yet these ambitions were never realized. The modern Middle East states remain weak, both internally, and externally as players in the world stage, even as they have been extremely durable and capable of surviving dramatic political shocks.

There is no single reason that can explain how political realities evolved in the Middle East, and no single dynamic that explains the developments in each separate state. What we have is a different mosaic of factors, both internal and external, that have shaped each nation in its own unique way. Many in the West tend to think of the political realities of the Middle East as a monolithic whole, whereas nothing could be further from the truth. From Lebanon to Turkey, and from Iran to the states of the Arabian peninsula, the differences between the systems of governance and attitudes towards them is vast. We should avoid over generalizing when examining the whole of the Middle East- instead each country is best seen on its own, examining both the factors unique to it, and those that have affected the whole region.

Following, is a very brief introduction to the political history of the state of Iran. What I attempt to show is the often tragic circumstances and events that have shaped the country, the great and largely negative role external powers have played in its development, and also to dispel the misconceptions that many have regarding the country, and show how current US policies towards it are ill-thought and historically unsound.

Entering the 20^th century, Iran was somewhat of a backwater in the Middle East. Weakened and shrunken as it was, its neighboring Ottoman empire had nevertheless a strong central government and administration, a developed economic infrastructure, strong cultural ties with the West, and a capable, though not comparable to that of the Great Powers, army. Iran on the other hand was undeveloped, with a weak army, and a central government that could control little more than some of the bigger cities, the remaining countryside being controlled by tribal chieftains. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the country was in effect a pawn and servant of the great powers, especially Russia and Great Britain. The Russian czar effectively completely controlled the northern third of the country and the Qazar monarch- even the monarch’s elite Cossack brigade was funded by the czar and led by Russian officers.

The South, though less directly, but just as importantly, was controlled by Great Britain, and British economic interests which had control of whatever little economic development there existed in the country. The country had thus become in effect a battleground for the two Great Powers. This was facilitated by the policies of Nasir al-Din, the Qazar shah until 1896. The British were alarmed by Russian influence in Iran, which they feared might reach across to India, and made it clear to the czar they would not allow excessive advances. Both powers wished to avoid a war over Iran, so the country was essentially allowed to exist only as a buffer between the interests of the two. Nasir al-Din, wishing to retain his own rule and his own luxurious royal lifestyle, and at the same time avoid any one power from gaining excessive influence (forcing the other to intervene with potential catastrophic results for the shah) sought to play the two Great Powers against each other, by offering economic concessions and rights to each. The result was twofold. Nasir al-Din gave vast economic concessions and the rights for the infrastructural and commodity control and development of his country for pitiably little in return, and at the same time, the constant disagreement of one power over the concessions made to the other meant very little actual development took place in the country.

The significant power and influence of the religious establishment can be understood through these late 19^th century dynamics. Whereas the Safavid shahs claimed to have divine authority from the Hidden Imam, the Qazar dynasty which replaced the Safavids in the late 18^th century claimed no such thing. As already seen, with the Qazar shahs having little actual central power themselves, the religious establishment in the country was free to assert for itself considerable power and claim to have sole legitimacy in speaking for religious matters, and the religious interpretation of political and economic issues. Those particularly learned, and seen as having authority to speak on such matters, were called the mujtahids. As the number of mujtahids increased in the 19^th century, those who were seen as having even superior judgment, and whose word carried precedence over that of other religious leaders were given the title of majra al-taqlid, and in the 20^th century it became customary for them to be referred to as ayatollah- the eye of God. During the reign of the Qazar shahs, especially during the era of disastrous economic policies of Nasir al-Din, the religious establishment came to be seen as the most legitimate and powerful source of opposition to the shah, and its positions carried great weight amongst the populace. When Nasir al-Din sold to a single British company the right to produce, sell and handle Iran’s entire tobacco crop, a product which had been traditionally handled by Iranians, it was the religious establishment which led the people to demonstrate in large numbers against the concession, and eventually led the shah to revoking it. Thus even as early as the late 19^th century the religious leaders of the country were seen as legitimate protectors of Iranian interests from the inefficiency of the government and the meddling of foreign interests.

Muzzafir al-Din Shah followed Nasir al-Din and his policies of economic concessions. His policies, granting foreigners superior custom rates in both the export and import trade, hit the Iranian merchant class hardest. Yet the greatest blow of all came when the government, out of touch with the economic trends of the time, and the fact that it could potentially hold a soon to be vastly important global commodity, sold in 1902 the rights to search for and exploit any potential oil resources in virtually the entire country to a single British subject, William D’Arcy, for a ridiculously low price and share of profits. By WWI the concession had led to the creation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the question of control of Iran’s oil resources greatly shaped developments in the country throughout the 20^th century. At the time of the concession, the Qazar shah proved to its subjects to be not only ineffective, but a blind moron as well.

These all escalated in the Constitutional revolution of 1905. Led by an uneasy coalition of merchants, religious leaders, and an emerging secular intelligencia, the demands of the revolution were met and came to be embodied in what came to be known as the ‘Fundamental Laws’. The laws were drafted by a new class of urban secular elements and certain elements of the clergy- and the new constitutional regime gave bright hopes to modernizing elements in Iranian society for the development of the country, until 1908 when the Russians moved in to destroy it and establish a puppet government of their own. To this day the Constitutional revolution is seen by Iranians as a kind of ‘golden age’ and a heroic time, held to the same level as many other peoples hold their wars and revolutions that led to independence and self-determination.

Two events in Iranian history produced similar positive hopes to Iranians, and both ended with tragically little results. The first was the ejection of the Qazar shahs by the Cossack commander Reza Khan, who went on to consolidate power to himself as Reza shah. Reza Shah was supported by the British who saw him as a potential stabilizing force that could serve British interests. Though he proved difficult to control and to have his own aspirations and reformists tendencies, he served British interests well, by being a ruthless leader with little care for democratization, and not afraid to use force to control his subjects and the clergy. Though he reformed many parts of Iranian life, the changes hardly met the hopes of Iranians or significantly moved the country forward, and he had little success in changing the management of the country’s oil resources. He did manage to renegotiate the terms of the D’Arcy concessions, but the changes were small (the country still only got 20% of oil profits) and AIOC still had a monopoly over the country’s oil resources. In essence to the eyes of many Iranians, AIOC had become a symbol of foreign interference, control and arrogance. It functioned as a state within a state in the areas where it worked exerting full governance and control, and showed little interest or inclination in negotiating with the government. The changes in the terms of the concession came after a lengthy 3 year negotiating period, during which AIOC made it obvious it was not interested in significant changes and more fair terms.

The second significant event in Iranian history was the brief rule as prime minister of Muhammad Mosaddiq from 1951 to 1953. First though it is of interest to examine the environment in which Muhammad Reza Shah took the throne in 1941 from his father Reza Khan. Raised to succeed his father, the new shah had little contact or knowledge of the problems of common Iranians. Moreover, he came to rule at a time when the territorial integrity and sovereignty of his nation was once again violated by foreign powers. Though it declared neutrality during WWII, this was never respected by the allied powers, which took over the country and divided it in spheres of influence between the British and USSR, much as they had in the late 19^th to early 20^th century. The trans-Iranian railway, a symbol of Iranian unity, was completely taken over for the interests of the Soviets and the British, as was in effect the entire infrastructure of the country. When Muhammad Reza Shah came to power, the various elements which had been oppressed during his fathers’ reign sought to reassert themselves, empowered by a common hatred of foreign influence in Iran.

It is also in this light that we must view the rise of Muhammad Mosaddiq. A curious figure in that he was born in aristocracy, Mosaddiq had a reputation as a powerful supporter of the democratization and sovereignty of Iran who had participated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905. He was placed under house arrest for his objection to Reza shah’s authoritarianism and was known as being honest and completely incorruptible. He managed to bring together elements from all sectors of Iranian life, from the secular intellectuals to the clergy, to Marxist and non-Marxist reformers, and from the merchant classes to everyday people. It was the oil issue which led to his rise in official power as prime minister. By this point in time AIOC had become a huge power itself in Iran, having full control over the oil rich parts of the country, building its own company city with its own unique laws, negotiating and hiring its own security force from local tribes, and giving all administrative and managerial positions to British subjects, hiring Iranians only as unskilled laborers. AIOC had come to represent Iran’s relationship with Europe and the West- quoting Dr. Cleveland’s ‘History of the Modern Middle East’:

“Cultural disrespect, economic domination, and imperial manipulation characterized Europe’s relationship with Iran for much of the century leading up to 1950… Iran, although never a colony or protectorate was nonetheless denied its sovereignty throughout the first half of the 20^th century. From the disadvantageous concessions granted by the Qajar shahs to the unfavorable oil agreement signed by Reza shah in 1933, Iran’s economic development was placed largely in the hands of European entrepreneurs; from the Russo-British invasion in 1914 to the Soviet-British occupation of 1941, Iran’s independence was violated whenever it suited European Great Powers to do so. Virtually all sectors of Iranian society resented the prominent role played by foreigners, whether they were Soviet engineers, British oil experts, or US military advisers. Many Iranians also directed their discontent at their monarchs, who had allowed foreign domination in the first place.”

The government had attempted to renegotiate revisions to the oil concessions in 1940. In 1950 the revisions were brought to the majlis (Iran’s constitutional assembly formed during the Constitutional revolution in 1905, but nonetheless holding little power after the Russian 1908 invasion, and during Reza Shahs’ autocratic rule), where they were opposed by Mosaddiq and his National Front coalition. The National front, organized demonstrations and popular uprisings to bring support for their cause, and in the midst of massive popular appeal, invited Mosaddiq in 1951 to take the role of Prime Minister. Mossadiqs’ had two primary goals. First, to bring back into effect the Fundamental laws of 1905 and limit the powers of the shah, creating a democratic system in Iran. And secondly, to nationalize AIOC Iranian operations, a long held goal of Iranian reformers, being a move of both great economic and symbolic significance, which met with massive popular support.

Mosaddig met stiff British resistance. AIOC called on the international community to boycott Iranian oil, and Britain complied, blocking oil shipments out of the country. Mossadiq also met with the opposition from the shah, pro-loyalists, and the Shah’s new allies, the United States. Mossadiq received a ruling placing the armed forces in the hands of the government rather than the shah, shrunk the military, and purged the officer corps. He also produced a land reform law, which would reform the vast royalist land wealth Reza Shah had accumulated during his autocratic rule. In short, Mossadiq wished to replace the power of the monarch with that of constitutional law, and make the army answerable to the government rather than the shah.

Uncompromising on the nationalization issue though, the oil boycott severely limited the income of Mosaddiqs government and weakened it. Both in order to aid their royal ally, and in order to prevent leftist groups such as the Iranian Tudeh party from gaining power as the National Front weakened, the United States in 1953 sent CIA agents to organize a coup with royalist elements and the support of the shah. Following the coup, which succeeded in overthrowing Mosaddiq, the shah, determined not to find himself in the same circumstances that nearly cost him his power, rebuild relations with the West, compromised on the oil nationalization issue, and was given massive military aid from the United States to build his security forces. The National Front and the Tudeh party were both disbanded, their leaders imprisoned, and ever since 1953, the shah dealt ruthlessly with any possible political opponent that might have arisen against him. Quoting again from Dr.Cleveland:

“In order to prevent the reemergence of organized opposition, the shah, with assistance from US and Israeli advisers, established an internal security organization, SAVAK, that became notorious for its pervasive surveillance operations and its brutal treatment of the political prisoners who packed Iran’s jails. From 1953 to 1979 political freedom did not exist in Iran. Although there were periods when limited expression was permitted, the overall picture was one of repression, manipulation and coercion. Election to the majlis were controlled, and the two party system the shah adopted to provide the appearance of democracy was so tightly restricted that Iranians referred to the two organizations as the ‘yes’ and the ‘yes sir’ parties.”

Thus it was that once again Iran’s chances for reform and true democratic change were crushed. It was until 1963 when the next sign of resistance towards the shah and authoritarianism emerged, when a fiery preacher, ayatollah Khomeini started preaching against the shah and his US allies. Khomeini was arrested by SAVAK in 1963 and exiled in 1964. News of his arrest in 1963 sparked wide-spread popular demonstrations in Tehran and other cities, which were violently and forcefully crushed at the cost of possibly thousands of lives.

And so it was that Iran moved on until 1979. The shah announced his plan for reform, known as the ‘White Revolution’, which aimed to modernize the country, though at the same time made no challenges to the institution of the monarchy or his own absolute rule. Though the White Revolution did bring about changes it hardly fulfilled the hopes and aspiration of the Iranian people. Thus in 1978 to 1979, again the shared hatred of the shah and his Western allies from fundamentally different groups -from leftists to merchants, and from the clergy to the intellectual middle class- led to revolt. The beginnings of the uprising occurred when a small band of students and merchants demonstrated against a government-newspaper’s extreme attack against Khomeini. The government response led to casualties, and the clergy, using Islamic tradition called the Iranian people to attend mosque services on the 40^th day after the passing of the dead, thus framing resistance against the shah in an Islamic framework that gave them authority over it. In the 40^th day, peaceful demonstrations were carried out against the government, and again the response led to casualties, and a renewed call for attendance at the 40^th day later. Again demonstrations were held, and once again some turned violent, leading the clergy to call for a third commemoration again, at the 40^th day. This coincided with the shah enforcing a new economic policy to fight inflationary pressures by freezing the economy, freezing wages, canceling government projects and other operations. This led to massive unemployment amongst the urban working classes, many of them recent migrants from rural areas and more susceptible to the message of the Islamic leaders of the anti-government movement. This time the mass of the working classes joined the students and merchants against the government, leading the shah to declare martial law, and ban all demonstrations. His law was ignored, and in September 8, Tehran exploded in demonstrations. The government reacted with force leading to hundreds of death, in a day that has come to be known in Iran as ‘Black Friday’. The response drove the huge mass of people into the camp of Khomeini, and forced even the secular reformists to endorse him to retain their legitimacy. Massive strikes followed, and the revolution reached its zenith in the 10 days of the Muharram, a religious ceremony in the Shiite calendar. Starting on December the 2^nd, thousands of protesters defied the government ban on demonstrations and took to the streets, denouncing the shah, the US, and demanding Khomeini’s return. An estimated 700 were left dead after the initial response, in the first 3 days of the Muharram, but demonstrations continued still, until the 12^th of December where more than 2 million marched in Tehran against the shah. At the same time, the military complex of the shah was crumbling. Soldiers, shocked at the constant violence against students and civilians turned against their officers and joined the demonstrators. In January the 16^th, the Shah facing enormous pressure left the country in self-exile, dying a year later. Ayatollah Khomeini returned in triumph, leader of an unarmed revolution that had toppled the king of kings.

The Islamic republic of Iran that was founded had specified goals both for its internal and external policy. Externally, it called for wide-spread Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East similar to what had occurred in Iran. It was this call, feared by both the powerful dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the United States, that led Saddam to invade Iran and spark one of the longest and bloodiest wars of the 20^th century. The extensive support of the United States, first for the shah, and then for Saddam Hussein only solidified in the minds of the Iranians the view that the foreign, US led community, was against them and cared nothing for freedom or democracy. However the war did in effect halt Iran’s ambitions for spreading the Islamic revolution.

Internally, the goal of the Islamic Republic was to create a social welfare state similar to Sweden, but based on Islamic principles. Yet despite Iranian hopes and efforts, this didn’t come to pass, as no agreement could be found between the various elements of society and the government over exactly what those Islamic principles were and how they could be reflected in political and economic policy. Thus despite the initial hopes of the revolution, the people of Iran today still find themselves embittered by their governments, having failed to achieve their goals, aspirations, and dreams of greatness and revival.

There are a number of major misconceptions in the West regarding Iran, born out of a consistent and powerful media and government misinformation campaign. First of all, Iran is not a dictatorship. It is a constitutional democracy. It is true that there exists a council of Guardians, headed by the ayatollah, which oversees the Islamic nature of the state according to the constitution. That can be seen in effect though as a parallel to the US supreme court, whose job it is to ensure that the government operates according to the constitution of the state. Admittedly the West may not like the Islamic nature of the Iranian constitution, but it a legitimate document with Iranian sources and popular support. Also it is true that the council of guardians has to approve a candidate for him to run in the elections. Yet in practice, the council and the ayatollah rarely interfere in everyday policy, and have not completely stopped elements with contrary views to their own from participating in the elections and even governing the country. The number of clergy in the parliament has also consistently been falling since 1979, reaching about 1/3 by 2000.

This is not to say that Iran is a paradise of freedom and democracy. Though it is as described, a constitutional democracy, its constitution is thoroughly theocratic in nature. The democratic system therefore has to function within the confines of constitutionally established religious parameters. It is true thus that many reformist laws were watered down or blocked by the council of guardians in the late 90s.   Though elements of disagreement with the status quo have been allowed to participate in politics, at the same time, political bullying has not stopped. Especially up to the 90s political imprisonment and torture was common, and more recently, a reformist trend of the late 90s has been reversed, with newspapers and voices of opposition either censored or silenced. At the same time it is true that at times, in matters of national emergency or very big policy decisions, the ayatollah has made his opinion known, after which it is impossible to act in a different way. Still, the country is free enough that Iranians are not afraid to express dissent and disapproval, or demonstrate for causes they believe in. Thus is modern Iran a curious mixture between tolerance and democracy, and monolithic religious conservatism and authoritarianism.

The error of US policy though is in its philosophy, as evidenced in the Iraq war- that it can remove ‘undemocratic regimes’ and that ‘democracy’ will spring up in their place. In the case of Iran, the US hard-line rhetoric, and its opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, rather than helping to serve open up the country and weaken the religious class, has the opposite results. By seeing the US opposing its ambitions, and acting as a proxy for serving Israeli aims, Iranians see once again a foreign influence which for decades had destroyed the country’s democratic ambitions, attempting to stop Iran from strengthening itself and achieving a strong position in the world. It was US and Israeli operatives which formed SAVAK, and now once again, it is the US doing the work of Israeli which is trying to hold the country back, while at the same time displaying the utmost hypocrisy by allowing Israel to arm itself extensively with a nuclear arsenal. The US has shown the upmost of arrogance by labeling Iran’s revolutionary guard, symbol of the revolution, as ‘terrorists’, while it accuses it of being a ‘terrorist’ and ‘theocratic state’ because it supports groups which Iranians, rightly or wrongly, see as fighting a just cause against the same enemies as they did in 1979.

Iran does not need an external power to school it in democracy. The Iranian people have many times in their history resisted violent and autocratic regimes- first in 1905, then in 1951, in 1963, and 1979. They have a long history of secular and intellectual movements fighting for democracy and sovereignty, and resisting the political control of the government by autocratic elements. It is ironic that those opportunities in which Iran was most likely to take a more secular path to democratization were destroyed by the West, while the circumstances which allowed for the Islamic clergy to gain power were created, again, by Western powers. As such, the policy of the West as regarding Iran has been a total and complete failure- it has lost control of its oil resources, helped in forming an Iranian environment completely hostile to it, and supplied it with a huge mass of military equipment originally given to the shah, and ending up in the hands of an Islamic state that hates it. It mirrors an overall disastrous Middle Eastern policy of the last 50 years which has created hatred towards any Western values, reinforced Islamic fundamentalism, and supported tyrants and dictators.

As a new generation of Iranians which never lived through the 1979 revolution and the years of the shah’s regime rises up, well educated, uneasy, and with its own dreams and ambitions, the worst thing the US can do is give them new reasons to distrust secular values, and show the West as arrogant and caring only for its own interest. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and the dropping of any pretensions of a spreading Islamic revolution, Iran has been taking small steps in opening itself up and allowing foreign ideas into it. The Iranian people are perfectly capable of promoting democracy in their country themselves and have historically proved so. In light of the prospects of an Obama presidency, I feel the US has a unique chance to mend relations with Iraq. Being an African American, a community also seen as traditionally oppressed by status-quo powers in the US, a president Obama could receive some degree of positive skepticism if he communicates with Iran in good faith and without the hostility of past administrations. Though history leaves as little hope, it is to the best interests of the US to rethink its policies and approaches.

Notes:

1) This analysis has been based and has been reliant on two sources:

The work of Professor R.Stephen Humphreys from (Humphreys, 2005), ‘From Imperialism to New World Order’, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age,2005 edition University of California Press, Los Angeles.

And the work of Professor William L. Cleveland for (Cleveland, 2004), A history of the Modern Middle East, 3^rd edition, Westview Press, Oxford.

Both books are excellent and I highly recommend them for anybody truly interested in understanding Middle Eastern dynamics.

The Middle East and Economic Development

On the Middle Eastern Economic Stagnation¹

The general trends in the economic environment of the Middle East can be seen in a cursory glance in Cairo. The city has now approximately 18 million inhabitants, up from 6 million in the early 70s and 3 million in the mid 60s. Beggars and informal workers fill the streets, the air is polluted and the urban sprawl has almost reached the pyramids. At the same time, even though the higher education system produces a vast number of qualified highly knowledgeable graduates, the number of job positions is exceptionally scarce- thus highly qualified individuals often take up low paying, low-skilled jobs such as cleaners, taxi and bus drivers, and trinket craftsmen, with little hope of ever finding a position suitable for their education.

It is misleading to say that the Middle East suffers from overpopulation- it, in fact, does not. The Middle East and North Africa have a combined population roughly equal to that of the United States, but spread over a much wider geographic area (in 1830, rough census figures for the entire region give a population of 34 million- risen to 68 million by the start of WWI- risen to 300 million near the year 2000). In terms of population density, the cities and nations of the Middle East are roughly comparable to many Western European examples, even in Egypt where the majority of the population lives in a very small minority of the land.

What the Middle East does suffer from is a population boom. The median age is roughly around 16 years. This is a result not of low life expectancy, but instead of extremely high birth rates, coupled with very low death rates.

There are thus two questions to examine- why do such large discrepancies exist between birth rates and death rates and why is there a lack of available work positions and economic growth?

Let’s examine birth and death rates first. Traditionally both figures had been high. Birth rates have been high due to cultural reasons, emphasizing a patriarchal society where fertility was valued. At the same time, high birth rates were also needed to compensate for high rates of infant mortality. Yet death rates began to decline steadily since the early 20^th century, whereas birthrates stayed immobile. This trend accelerated in the years since the 1970s, which saw a dramatic drop in infant mortality, and a rise in average life expectancy. By 1990 death rates per 1000 of population in many countries matched those of the United States (Iran, Morocco- 9 per 1000) while in many other countries, they were even lower (Saudi Arabia, Turkey- 7 per 1000)². The causes for this can be traced to successful government policies which improved health care, nutrition, clean water provision and education. In many richer countries like Saudi Arabia for example, very high quality healthcare facilities were created that matched and even surpassed those available in the developed West. Yet even in poorer countries like Egypt, the development of smaller, rural clinics serving the entire population, proved highly successful in providing essential health care services. Public education also helped in spreading issues of hygiene and health care among the overall populace.

The success of such policies has proved a double-edged sword. Though obviously positive in the effects it had on life expectancy and infant mortality, the rapid drop in death rates, coupled with the still high birth rates created a population boom. Though as mentioned, in absolute numbers the Middle East does not suffer from overpopulation, it will in a few decades if current trends persist. More importantly in the short term, economic stagnation has come from the inability of the economy to cope with the rapid influx of new workers in the economy. This large influx costs the economy much more than it gives to it. Most young people will be unable to work anywhere but at the most basic and low-paying of jobs, and will be incapable of generating enough value to make up for the costs of their public schooling and health provision.

Thus many Middle Eastern countries are trapped in a form of a growth trap. Traditionally any amount of capital investment per unit labor will produce some return, which will stimulate further investment, an increase in capital per unit labor, which will in turn create more return and so forth, resulting in the growth of the economy³. Yet if population growth is too high, investment returns will be dwarfed by the increase in labor, and thus capital per unit labor will shrink. Though Middle Eastern economies do not shrink, their growth rates are exceptionally low, resulting in the minimal provision of new jobs. Why has investment been insufficient to keep the economy growing enough to match population growth rates, or if it has been sufficient, why has it produced such low returns?

The reasons can be found in an assortment of government policy errors since the mid 50s, but also in the legacies remaining by the colonial years, and the mismanagement of many Middle Eastern nations by their colonial overlords.

Essentially government policy has been shaped by the need to create legitimacy for the governments of the Middle Eastern states, many of which gained their power through undemocratic means, and their attempts to forge policy that would ensure their stay in power. First amongst the most damaging policies of the Middle Eastern states was the race for military buildup and vast weapons expenditures. Until the 1990s, military spend as a percentage of total GDP of many Middle Eastern nations dwarfed even that of the United States. Worse still, unlike the United States, that expenditure was directed towards foreign weapons manufacturers, and not a domestic industry. For the nations of the Middle East, the arms buildup was money wasted on consumption of military goods, offering no long term prospects or opportunities for growth or creating economic value. Only in Israel was this expenditure mostly funded through aid by an outside power, and a respectable domestic industry for weapons manufacture formed. Even when military spending subsided in the 1990s, long term damage was done, as many states were heavily indebted to outside powers from which they had purchased their weapons.

The reasons for the military buildup were many. The regimes of many states wished to have military power to secure their rule against both inside and outside enemies. But also the instability of the region, seen in such conflicts as the Israeli-Palestinian one and the wars of Israel with Egypt, the Iran-Iraq war, and the subsequent war in Kuwait, served as a driving factor for the expansion of military spending. In that respect, the West is also guilty for all too often it served a primary role in the escalation and origin of those conflicts.

The second dimension of policy has been the spending in social services and welfare. In a way, this has also been a source of security for the governments of the Middle Eastern states, from their own citizens, in an attempt to legitimize their seizing of power. Even so, many of the leaders of those nations genuinely thought it their duty to expand social welfare and provide for their people. Such policies have proven to have both positive and negative effects. As already noted, they drove down death rates while birth rates remained high, creating a population boom and thus adding to the unemployment problem. And they have all too often been spending which was kept from more productive investment. Yet who can blame the governments of the Middle East for aiding their people when all too often many of them face starvation and homelessness. And had investment and job prospects been properly managed, then the positive externalities this social welfare spending has created – a well educated and healthy labor force and good infrastructure- would surely have aided in the further development and growth of the Middle Eastern economies.

We thus turn to the third dimension of policy, concerning investment and the industrial direction the governments of the Middle East wished to take their nations to. The goal was to attempt to escape the fate of being pure commodity exporters, focusing on a single, commodity (either oil or an agricultural good- e.g. cotton in the example of Egypt) whose price was controlled by outside market forces, and thus a future of exporting at low prices and importing at expensive ones. The historic experience they had with colonialism ever promoted this attitude. It was colonial powers which enforced an economy of monoculture (the growing and reliance on a single commodity), and it was Western firms which had the right to managing the commodity wealth of these states and derived much of the profits from them (the example of Iran’s Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, AIOC, and the condescending way with which it exploited that nations oil wealth is a prime one).

The aim of escaping a fate of pure commodity production was a sound one, but the direction in which governments sought to take their economies was not. What they sought was to create an economy of autarky. To manufacture imported consumer goods at home, and build heavy industry to base that manufacturing on. They saw the examples of the US and Germany up to the 50s as an example of the success of such a strategy. Yet they were faced with two problems- they had neither the mineral and commodity resources, nor the machinery and tools needed for manufacture, which meant those would still have to be imported rather than produced at domestic industries. More importantly, their domestic markets were too small to justify such an economic outlook, and goods produced for their domestic markets were not competitive for international consumption. The post WWII model for success for developing countries was instead an export oriented economy focusing on producing value-adding manufactured goods, as seen in Japan, the Asian tigers, and more recently, China and India. As an example, how could manufacturers in Egypt producing goods meant to replace consumer imports in the domestic market be successful when their domestic markets were so small, and when their products, designed for the Egyptian market, could not compete in foreign markets with goods made from Japan or Korea? The authoritarian governments in the Middle East sought to control the direction of the economy completely and could not limit themselves with merely providing welfare services and public goods, to which they proved very successful. This limited the role of the free market far too much, and thus removed the disciplined plurality which would have identified the inefficiency of an autarky economy and moved the countries to more efficient routes. As it is, many Middle Eastern nations still rely on being primarily commodity exporters to sustain their economies.

Thus the economic stagnation in the Middle East can be seen as a result of several factors- historical factors derived from the memories of the colonial era, cultural factors which promoted high birth rates in the first place, geo-political ones, which aided in the rise of authoritarian regimes and justified their race for weapons buildup, and the failed economic policies of the regimes just mentioned.

There are some potential positive trends: the arms race has slowed down, many states have been left with a highly efficient infrastructure, and attitudes towards private investment are getting more reasonable. But the problems of the Middle East are far too complex, and all too often the governments in the region are incapable of making wide ranging reforms. Reforms in social welfare would likely produce too much discontent amongst the general populace- and righteously so. And neither are birth rates likely to fall, nor enough new job opportunities created to tackle unemployment in the short run, whatever the current positive trends. It is unlikely thus that the economic stagnation in the Middle East will end any time soon.

NOTES:

1- This analysis is highly based and highly reliant on the excellent work of Professor R.Stephen Humphreys from (Humphreys, 2005), ‘Hard Realities: Population Growth and Economic Stagnation’, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2005 edition.

I am currently reading and highly recommend Dr. Humphreys’ book, and hope that it will aid me in further analysis of Middle Eastern topics in the near future.

2- Figures come from World Bank, Social Indicators of Development 1994, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press for the World Bank 1994), World Bank, World Tables 1994, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press for the World Bank 1994), World Bank, World Development Report 1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

3- The economic growth analysis at this point is of course a huge oversimplification. I’m sure economists could find any number of troubles and practical nuisances with its theory, but I feel it shows the problem of a booming population in a developing economy with low current investment and capital.

First Post

First post in the blog, put here by the wordpress software, and a bit of a trial run for me of how the bloging software works, so nothing much to see.